TAXATION—MEMBERSHIP IN NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AS TAXABLE PROPERTY—TAXATION AT DOMICIL OF OWNER.—The plaintiff was owner of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange, his domicil being in Ohio. He sued to enjoin the listing for taxation in Ohio of the membership in the exchange. *Held,* that such membership was personal property and was taxable at the domicil of the owner under a statute that "All real or personal property in this state . . . . and all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, or otherwise, of persons residing in this state, shall be subject to taxation." *Anderson v. Durr* (1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 57.

See COMMENTS, *supra,* p. 916.

TORTS—JOINT TORT-FEASORS—RELEASE OF ONE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE AS A DISCHARGE OF OTHERS.—The plaintiff was injured by the concurring fault, as he claimed, of the defendant and two railway companies. In consideration of $7,500 he made a written covenant not to sue one of the railway companies, expressly reserving his right of action against the others. *Held,* that this did not operate as a discharge of the defendant. *Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith* (1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 300.

The plaintiff was riding on a truck laden with inflammable waste and was severely burned when the waste caught fire. The plaintiff alleges that the fire was caused by the falling of the defendant's defective trolley wire upon the truck; but there was a possibility that the truck driver was concurrently negligent. In consideration of $75 the plaintiff executed a sealed release of the owner of the truck, without reservation. *Held,* that the defendant was also thereby released, even though the owner of the truck was not in fact responsible for the injury and the defendant was so responsible. *Cormier v. Worcester St. Ry. Co.* (1919, Mass.) 125 N. E. 549.

See COMMENTS, *supra,* p. 909.

TORTS—NEGLIGENCE—LAST CLEAR CHANCE.—The plaintiff's decedent was driving a dump cart along a road in the center of which was a double-track trolley line. The decedent turned to cross the tracks when a car was approaching about three hundred feet away at more than twenty miles an hour. The motorman shouted a warning but when it was seen that the decedent would continue to cross, it was too late to bring the car to a stop. A verdict for the plaintiff was set aside as being against the evidence. *Held,* that there was no error. *Buijnak v. Connecticut Co.* (1920, Conn.) 109 Atl. 244.

See COMMENTS, *supra,* p. 896.

TORTS—NEGLIGENCE—LAST CLEAR CHANCE—REQUIRES ONLY MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE OF PERIL.—Employees of the plaintiff stopped to change an automobile tire at the side of a road, about three feet away from the defendant's trolley tracks. It was dark and the headlights of the machine were lighted. While so engaged two of the employees were killed by the defendant's trolley car which approached at a speed of fifteen miles an hour, with a low-power light in the place of the usual high-power light. The motorman did not see the decedents until too late to stop the car. The plaintiff having been compelled to pay compensation to the dependents of the decedents sued the defendant company. *Held,* that the plaintiff should recover. *Tullock v. Connecticut Co.* (1919, Conn.) 108 Atl. 556.

See COMMENTS, *supra,* p. 896.

TORTS—NEGLIGENCE—LAST CLEAR CHANCE—NECESSITY OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO AVOID HARM AFTER KNOWLEDGE OR MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.—The plaintiff was seriously injured by being struck by the defendant's trolley car, while he was lying asleep at night in the grass by the side of the trolley tracks with one or both of his feet extending over one of the rails. In an action for damages, the